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Abstract 
We analyze firms’ incentive to invest in product R&D and how this product R&D 
affects firms’ incentive to petition for an antidumping protection. It is found that, 
when one of the governments implements antidumping policy, the protected firm 
decreases its product R&D investment while the constrained firm invests more. The 
total product R&D investment is even lower than that under free trade, which in turn 
may deteriorate the profit of protected firm. Accordingly, the protected firm may 
withdraw its anti-dumping petition. Moreover, we show that the constrained firm has 
the incentive to petition for a fight-back anti-dumping policy only if the level of 
product R&D can be endogenously determined. Finally, such an anti-dumping 
retaliation increases the incentive of the protected firm to petition for an anti-dumping 
protection if the level of product R&D is large enough. 
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Anti-dumping Policy and Product R&D 
1. Introduction 
In the real world, anti-dumping (AD, hereafter) policy is felt to be a mechanism 
fostering the interests of domestic producers. Although AD policies are commonly 
considered as a kind of trade policy, they have potential impacts on behaviors or 
strategies of domestic and foreign industries. Konings and Vandenbussche (2005) use 
panel data of about 4000 EU producers that were involved in AD cases to estimate 
markups before and after the filing of a case, and find that AD protection has positive 
and significant effects on domestic markups. AD policies may encourage foreign 
firms to engage in FDI (Belderbos, 1997; Blonigen, 2002; Belderbos et al., 2004), or 
improve their product quality (Vandenbussche and Wauthy, 2001).  
 Some empirical papers have already devoted into explaining why AD retaliation 
happens or why there are so many firms withdraw their AD petitions; however, to the 
best of our knowledge, there are no papers explain these phenomenon theoretically. 
Moreover, we would also like to know whether AD retaliation increases or decreases 
firms’ incentive to petition theirs government for an AD protection. We tackle these 
issues by taken firms’ R&D behaviors into account. 
Empirical evidence has shown that AD protections often target on R&D intensive 
industries such as electronics, primary metals, chemical and mechanical engineering 
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industries (Neils, 2000). Thus, it is an important objective to investigate the R&D 
behavior under AD policies. Gao and Miyagiwa (2005) is the first paper to investigate 
the impacts of AD policies on the cost-reducing R&D incentives of the protected firm 
and the dumping firm. Given an ad valorem transport cost, they find that a unilateral 
AD policy decreases (increases) the cost-reducing R&D of the protected (dumping) 
firm. However, approximately three-fourths R&D by firms in the US are devoted to 
product R&D (Scherer and Rose, 1990). That is to say, Gao and Miyagiwa (2005) can 
explain only part of the reality. The main aim of this paper is to explore the product 
R&D strategies of the firms when they are protected or constrained by antidumping 
policy. We shall also consider the impacts of antidumping on consumer surplus and 
welfare when firms can determine their product R&D levels. 
Understanding a firm’s behavior in R&D has been an important objective of 
industrial organization. A substantial literature has highlighted the welfare 
consequences of marginal-cost-reducing (process) R&D investment (see for example, 
Arrow, 1962; Brander and Spencer, 1983; D'Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988, among 
others). More recently, literature on R&D has started to center on product R&D and 
its linkage between process R&D (for example, Cohen and Klepper, 1996; Bonanno 
and Haworth, 1998; Lin and Saggi, 2002, Symeonidis, 2003) In addition, Haaland and 
Kind (2008) examine the industrial R&D investments and policy competition between 
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countries in an international setting. They show that trade liberalization generates 
more R&D and the policy competition between countries depending critically on the 
competitiveness of the market. The product R&D setup of this paper is basically 
borrowed from Lin and Saggi (2002). They compare the impact of competition mode 
on firms’ product incentive whereas we investigate the effect of antidumping policies 
on the product R&D incentive of firms. 
Our paper is mostly relevant to Gao and Miyagiwa (2005). In their cost-reducing 
R&D model, the ad valorem trade cost is crucial to the results. The firms has an 
incentive to alter their cost-reducing R&D under antidumping policy mainly because 
the cost saving effect becomes larger (lower) for the dumping (protected) firm. In 
other words, AD policy has no effect under specific trade cost as the cost saving effect 
not affected by AD policy. However, in our model, product differentiation can affect 
the dumping margin which gives the two firms some strategic effect to change their 
product R&D level even without considering the cost saving effect. Moreover, Gao 
and Miyagiwa (2005) only compares the R&D levels whereas we compare the welfare 
implications under AD policy which sheds some light and deserves some policy 
implications for the developing and developed countries. 
In this paper, we mainly focus on price undertaking as it is more amiable to the 
dumping firm. The dumping firm usually chooses to accept the price set by the 
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authority rather than paying duties (Gao and Miyagiwa, 2005). Furthermore, although 
countries such as the US and Canada usually adopt antidumping duties as their 
instrument against the dumping country, most of EU antidumping filings finalize with 
the acceptance by the EU of a price undertaking.1 The study by Zanardi (2004) also 
shows that countries like Japan, Finland, Sweden and South Korea make frequent use 
of price undertakings.2 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our 
basic model. Section 3 investigates the equilibrium under unilateral anti-dumping 
policy. Section 4 examines the bilateral anti-dumping policy case. Section 5 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. The Benchmark Model 
Assume there are two countries, Country Home and Country Foreign, host one 
firm each. Firm H and Firm F produce differentiated products and ship the product 
from one country to another while incurring a per-unit trade cost, t. We further assume 
that the utility function of a representative consumer in both countries is as follows: 
 2 2
1
( ) 2
2
U a q Q bq rqQ bQ m      ,        
                                                 
1 As agreed on the Essen Summit in 1994, these Agreements grant a preferential role for price 
undertakings (see e.g. Annex IV to the Conclusions of the Essen European Council 1994; Chapter IV, 
Article 34 of the European Agreement with Bulgaria). 
2 Zanardi (2004) shows that, for the period of 1881-2001, Japan accepted more undertakings, i.e. in 
about 60% of the cases, as well as Finland and Sweden before their EU membership (82% and 100% 
respectively). 
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 2 2
1
* ( * *) * 2 * * *
2
U a q Q bq rq Q bQ m      ,      
where the variables in lower (upper) case are the action taken by the Home (Foreign) 
firm and those with asterisk are happened in country F. Moreover, r  is the level of 
product differentiation and m is the consumption of numerarie goods. Accordingly, the 
demand functions of the two products in the two different countries are as follows: 
 
2 2
( )a b r bp rP
q
b r
  


, 
2 2
( )a b r bP rp
Q
b r
  


;      (1) 
 
2 2
( ) * *
*
a b r bp rP
q
b r
  


, 
2 2
( ) * *
*
a b r bP rp
Q
b r
  


.     (2) 
Now, we assume both Home firm and Foreign firm can invest on product R&D to 
enlarge the product differentiation. More specifically, r b k K   , where k (K) is 
the improvement on product differentiation made by Home (Foreign) firm. If both 
firms do not invest on product R&D, then consumers may consider the final goods are 
homogeneous. For simplicity, we assume , [0, 2]k K b .  
The profit function of Home firm and Foreign firm are as follows: 
( ) ( * ) * ( )p c q p c t q f k       ,        (3) 
( ) ( * ) * ( )P c t Q P c Q f K       ,        (4) 
where c is the marginal production cost, t is the per-unit transport cost, and f(k) (f(K)) 
is the R&D investment of Home (Foreign) firm, and ( ) 0f k k    ( ( ) 0f K K   ) 
and 2 2( ) 0f k k    ( 2 2( ) 0f K K   ) .  
 In the following, we would like to investigate the effect of anti-dumping policy. 
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As a first step, we shall derive the equilibrium under free trade. The game structure is 
as follows: In the first stage, Home firm and Foreign firm simultaneously determines 
the level of R&D investment on product differentiation. In the second stage, given the 
level of product differentiation, both firms compete in price in both countries. We use 
backward induction to derive the sub-game perfect equilibrium. 
In the second stage, both firms determine the prices in Home country and 
Foreign country simultaneously. By solving 0p   , 0P   , * 0p    
and * 0P    simultaneously, we can derive the optimal prices under free trade as 
follows: 
 
2 2
( )
2 4
FT
a b r bc brt
p
b r b r
 
 
 
, 
2
2 2
( ) 2
2 4
FT
a b r bc b t
P
b r b r
 
 
 
;   (5) 
 
2
2 2
( ) 2
*
2 4
FT
a b r bc b t
p
b r b r
 
 
 
, 
2 2
( )
*
2 4
FT
a b r bc brt
P
b r b r
 
 
 
,  (6) 
where the superscript FT denotes the equilibrium under free trade regime. 
Accordingly, the dumping margins are as follows: 
( )
( * )
2
FT FT
b r t
p p t
b r

  

, 
( )
* ( )
2
FT FT
b r t
P P t
b r

  

. 
It should be noted that the dumping margin increases as the product differentiation 
increases. The final outputs can be derived by substituting (5) and (6) into (1) and 
(2), and are as follows: 
2
2 2 2 2
( )
*
(2 )( ) ( )(4 )
FT FT
b a c b rt
q Q
b r b r b r b r

  
   
, 
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2 2
2 2 2 2
( ) (2 )
*
(2 )( ) ( )(4 )
FT FT
b a c b b r t
Q q
b r b r b r b r
 
  
   
. 
By substituting FTp , FTP , *FTp , and *FTP  (i.e., (5) and (6)) into   and   
(i.e., (3) and (4)), the equilibrium profit can be derived as follows: 
 
2 2
2 2
( )(2 2 ) ( )
( )
2( )(2 ) 2( )(2 )
FT
b b r a c t b b r t
f k
b r b r b r b r

   
  
   
,    (7) 
 
2 2
2 2
( )(2 2 ) ( )
( )
2( )(2 ) 2( )(2 )
FT
b b r a c t b b r t
f K
b r b r b r b r
   
   
   
.    (8) 
 In the first stage, both the firms determine the level of R&D investment on 
product differentiation. By differentiating (7) with respect to k and (8) with respect to 
K, the first-order derivatives are as follows: 
 
2 2
2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2
2 3 2 3
( )(2 2 ) ( ) ( )
2( )(2 ) 2( )(2 )
( )(2 2 ) ( ) ( )
( 1) ( 1)
( ) (2 ) ( ) (2 )
FTd r b b r a c t r b b r t f k
dk k r b r b r k r b r b r k
b b br r a c t b b br r t f k
b r b r b r b r k


 
           
                
       
    
    
, 
 
2 2
2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2
2 3 2 3
( )(2 2 ) ( ) ( )
2( )(2 ) 2( )(2 )
( )(2 2 ) ( ) ( )
( 1) ( 1)
( ) (2 ) ( ) (2 )
FTd r b b r a c t r b b r t f K
dK K r b r b r K r b r b r K
b b br r a c t b b br r t f K
b r b r b r b r K
 
            
     
           
       
    
    
. 
By solving / 0FTd dk   and * / 0FTd dK   simultaneously, we can have the 
optimal level of R&D investment on product differentiation, that is, kFT and KFT.  
 
3. Unilateral Anti-dumping Policy 
In this section, we would like to investigate how unilateral anti-dumping affects 
the firm’s incentive on product differentiation. Without loss of generality, we assume 
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Home country imposes price-undertaking on Foreign firm, that is, *P P t  . The 
profit function of Home firm and Foreign firm are (3) and (4); however, the Foreign 
firm is subject to the price-undertaking constraint when determining the prices. Let 
the objective function of Foreign firm be as follows: 
 * *L P P t       ,           
where   is the Largrange multiplier. By solving 0p   , 
* 0L P   , * 0p   , * * 0L P   , and * 0L     simultaneously, we can 
derive the optimal prices under free trade as follows: 
 
( ) (3 )
2 4 (2 )
U
a b r bc b r rt
p
b r b b r
  
 
 
, 
( ) (3 )
2 2(2 )
U
a b r bc b r t
P
b r b r
  
 
 
;  (9) 
 
2 2( ) (4 3 )
*
2 4 (2 )
U
a b r bc b br r t
p
b r b b r
   
 
 
, 
( ) ( )
*
2 2(2 )
U
a b r bc b r t
P
b r b r
  
 
 
, (10) 
where the superscript “U” denotes the equilibrium under unilateral anti-dumping 
policy. It should be noted that the dumping margins now are as follows: 
( ) ( )
( * ) ( * )
2 2
U U FT FT
b r t b r t
p p t p p t
b b r
 
      

, 
* ( ) 0U UP P t   . 
If Home country implements anti-dumping policy on Foreign firm, then the dumping 
margin of Home firm in Foreign country is higher than that under free trade regime. 
Moreover, given the effort on product differentiation, that is, k and K, we have 
FT Up p , FT UP P , * *FT Up p , * *FT UP P . Since the Foreign firm is subject 
to the price-undertaking, it should raise the Home price (i.e., UP ) and lower the 
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Foreign price (i.e., *UP ). The price competition in Home (Foreign) country is less 
(more) intensive. Substituting Up , UP , *Up , and *UP  (i.e., (9) and (10)) into (1) 
and (2), the outputs of Home firm and Foreign firm are as follows: 
2 2
( ) (3 )
(2 )( ) 4( )(2 )
U
b a c b r rt
q
b r b r b r b r
 
 
   
, 
2 2
2 2
( ) (3 )(2 )
(2 )( ) 4 ( )(2 )
U
b a c b r b r t
Q
b r b r b b r b r
  
 
   
, 
2 2
2 2
( ) (4 )
*
(2 )( ) 4( )(2 )
U
b a c b br r t
q
b r b r b r b r
  
 
   
, 
3 2 2 3
2 2
( ) (2 2 3 )
*
(2 )( ) 4 ( )(2 )
U
b a c b b r br r t
Q
b r b r b b r b r
   
 
   
. 
From a direct comparison, we can find that U FTq q , U FTQ Q ,  * *U FTq q  
and * *U FTQ Q . The equilibrium profit in the second stage can be derived by 
substituting Up , UP , *Up , and *UP  (i.e., (9) and (10)) into (3) and (4), and are 
as follows: 
 
2 2
2
( )(2 2 ) ( )
( )
2( )(2 ) 8 ( )
U
b b r a c t b r t
f k
b r b r b b r

   
  
  
,      (11) 
 
2
2
( )(2 2 )
( )
2( )(2 )
U
b b r a c t
f K
b r b r
  
  
 
.        (12) 
Given k and K, from comparing (7) and (11), and (8) and (12), it is easy to show that 
U FT   and U FT   . The protected firm (i.e., Home firm) earns a higher profit 
under unilateral anti-dumping protection while the constrained firm (i.e., Foreign firm) 
losses. 
In the first stage, both firms determines an R&D level on product differentiation 
to maximize profits, the first-order derivative of Home firm and Foreign firm can be 
  10 
derived by differentiating (11) with respect to k and (12) with respect to K, and are as 
follows: 
 
2 2
2
2 2 2 2
2 3 2
( )(2 2 ) ( ) ( )
2( )(2 ) 8 ( )
( )(2 2 ) ( )
( 1) ( 1)
( ) (2 ) 4( )
Ud r b b r a c t r b r t f k
dk k r b r b r k r b b r k
b b br r a c t t f k
b r b r b r k


 
           
     
          
     
    
   
,  (13) 
 
2
2
2 2 2
2 3
( )(2 2 ) ( )
2( )(2 )
( )(2 2 ) ( )
( 1)
( ) (2 )
Ud r b b r a c t f K
dK K r b r b r K
b b br r a c t f K
b r b r K

       
  
     
     
  
  
.     (14) 
By solving / 0Ud dk   and / 0Ud dK  , we can have the optimal level of R&D 
investment on product differentiation, that is, kU and KU. Moreover, given k and K, by 
comparing /Ud dk  and /Ud dK  with respect to /FTd dk  and /FTd dK , 
we find that /Ud dK > /FTd dK = /FTd dk > /Ud dk . The protected firm acts 
passive on product R&D; however, the constrained firm acts more aggressive on 
product R&D. Accordingly, we can infer that kU<kFT while KU>KFT.  
Moreover, by summing up (13) and (14) yields: 
2 2 2 2
2 3 2
2 ( )(2 2 ) ( ) ( )
( ) (2 ) 4( )
U Ud d b b br r a c t t f k f K
dk dK b r b r b r k K


       
   
    
. (15) 
Evaluate (15) at kU and KU, we would have    / / 0U Ud dk d dK    . Similarly, 
by substituting k=kFT and K=KFT into (15), we can derive that: 
2 2 2 2
2 3 2
,
0
2 ( )
0
( ) (2 ) 4( )FT FT
U U FT FT FT FT
FT FT FT
k k K K
d d d d b b br r t t
dk dK dk dK b r b r b r
 
 

    
     
  
,(16) 
which implies FT FT U UK k K k   . We make this result as the following 
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proposition. 
 
Proposition 1. A unilateral anti-dumping policy stifles product R&D of the protected 
firm whereas it stimulates that of the constrained firm increases. Furthermore, the 
aggregate investment on product R&D is necessarily suppressed by the unilateral 
anti-dumping policy. 
 
We are now in the position to investigate whether the protected firm, Home firm, 
has the incentive to petition for an AD protection. To this aim, we shall derive the 
profit change of Home firm after the product R&D is taken into account. From (11) 
and evaluated the product R&D level of both firms at free trade level (i.e., kFT and 
KFT), it is easy to derive that ( , ) ( , )U FT FT FT FT FTk K k K  . Moreover, the profit 
change of the Home firm with respect to product R&D under unilateral AD policy is 
as follows: 
( )
( )
( )
U
U
r d f k
d d k K dk
k K dr k


 

 
  
  
. 
From Proposition 1, since kU<kFT , KU>KFT and FT FT U UK k K k   , we have 
( ) 0d k K   and 0dk  . The latter (i.e., 0dk  ) increases the profit of Home firm 
under unilateral AD policy as the home firm decreases the investment on product 
R&D. However, the former (i.e., ( ) 0d k K  ) decreases the profit of Home firm as 
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the products become less differentiated. If this effect is large enough, then the profit of 
Home firm may even lower than that under free trade. We make this result as the 
following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2. When the product R&D is taken into account, the protected firm may 
withdraw its anti-dumping petition as the level of aggregate product R&D drops too 
much. 
 
This result in some extent explains why the protected firm withdraws its AD petition. 
As the aggregate investment in product R&D decreases too much, the products 
become less differentiated, which intensifies the competition and dampens the profit 
of protected firm.   
 
4. Bilateral Anti-dumping Policy 
In this section, we consider the trade retaliation case in which each government 
institutes antidumping action on its foreign firm. In this context, we examine how the 
bilateral anti-dumping policy affects the product R&D incentives of the two firms. All 
the model setups and game structure are the same as those in the previous section, 
except that now the foreign also imposes antidumping policy on the domestic firm. 
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In the second stage, both firms determine the optimal prices subject to the 
price-undertaking policies. That is to say, Home (Foreign) firm should satisfy the 
constraint such that *p p t   ( *P P t  ) when determining its prices. The 
objective functions of the two firms under antidumping policies can be specified as 
follows: 
 * *L p p t       , 
 * *L P P t       , 
where   and *  are the Largrangian multipliers. By solving 0L p   , 
* 0L P   , * 0L p   , * * 0L P   , * 0L    , and * 0L     
simultaneously, we can derive the optimal prices under bilateral anti-dumping as 
follows: 
 
( ) ( )
*
2 2(2 )
B B
a b r bc b r t
p P
b r b r
  
  
 
,   
 
( ) (3 )
*
2 2(2 )
B B
a b r bc b r t
p P
b r b r
  
  
 
,  
where the superscript “B” denotes the equilibrium under bilateral anti-dumping 
regime. Given k and K, by comparing the prices under bilateral anti-dumping regime 
with respect to that under free trade regime and unilateral anti-dumping regime, we 
can have that B FT Up p p  , FT U BP P P  , * * *B FT Up p p  , 
* * *FT U BP P P  . It should be noted that the constrained firm’s (i.e., Foreign firm) 
pricing strategy is independent of whether other firms are subject to anti-dumping 
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policy.  
 Substituting Bp , BP , *Bp , and *BP  into (1) and (2), the outputs of Home 
firm and Foreign firm are as follows: 
2 2
2 2
( ) ( 2 )
*
(2 )( ) 2( )(2 )
B B
b a c b br r t
q Q
b r b r b r b r
  
  
   
,      (17) 
2 2
2 2
( ) (3 )
*
(2 )( ) 2( )(2 )
B B
b a c b r t
Q q
b r b r b r b r
 
  
   
.      (18) 
Comparing the outputs under bilateral anti-dumping regime with respect to that under 
free trade and unilateral anti-dumping regime, we can find that B U FTq q q  , 
B U FTQ Q Q  ,  * * *B U FTq q q   and * * *B U FTQ Q Q  . For both firms, 
bilateral anti-dumping policy enlarges the market share of its protected market and 
shrinks the market share of its constrained market. The equilibrium profit can be 
derived by substituting Bp , BP , *Bp , and *BP  (i.e., (17) and (18)) into (3) and 
(4), and are as follows: 
 
2
2
( )(2 2 )
( )
2( )(2 )
B
b b r a c t
f k
b r b r

  
 
 
,        (19) 
 
2
2
( )(2 2 )
( )
2( )(2 )
B
b b r a c t
f K
b r b r
  
  
 
.        (20) 
Given k and K, from (7), (8), (11), (12), (19), and (20), we can show that 
U FT FT B B U          . Moreover, both firms have a higher profit under 
free trade regime than that under bilateral anti-dumping regime. Accordingly, we can 
have the following two lemmas. 
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Lemma 1. Given the level of investment on product R&D, the competing firms have 
a higher profit under the regime of free trade than that under bilateral 
anti-dumping policies.  
 
The intuition is as follows. When both firms are subject to the regulation of AD 
policies, they would raise their export price and lower their domestic price to 
eliminate the dumping margin. This pricing behavior implies that both firms yield 
some rents to its rival in their dominant market (i.e., domestic market) as receiving 
some compensation in their weak market (i.e., foreign market). This lowers the profits 
of competing firms under the regime of bilateral AD.   
 
Lemma 2. Given the level of investment on product R&D, the constrained firm has 
no incentives to petition for a fight-back anti-dumping policy. 
 
Given the level of investment in product R&D, we have derived that B U   . If 
petitioning for a AD protection has cost, then the constrained firm has no incentive to 
do so. 
 
In the first stage, both firms determines the R&D effort on product differentiation 
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to maximize profits, the first-order derivative of Home firm and Foreign firm can be 
derived by differentiating (19) with respect to k and (20) with respect to K, and are as 
follows: 
 
2
2
2 2 2
2 3
( )(2 2 ) ( )
2( )(2 )
( )(2 2 ) ( )
( 1) ,
( ) (2 )
Bd r b b r a c t f k
dk k r b r b r k
b b br r a c t f k
b r b r k



      
  
     
     
  
  
 
 
2
2
2 2 2
2 3
( )(2 2 ) ( )
2( )(2 )
( )(2 2 ) ( )
( 1) .
( ) (2 )
Bd r b b r a c t f K
dK K r b r b r K
b b br r a c t f K
b r b r K

       
  
     
     
  
  
 
By solving / 0Bd dk   and / 0Bd dK  , we can have the optimal level of R&D 
investment on product differentiation, that is, kB and KB. Given k and K, by comparing 
/Bd dk  and /Bd dK  with respect to /Ud dk , /Ud dK , /FTd dk , and 
/FTd dK , it is derivable that 
/Bd dk = /Bd dK = /Ud dK > /FTd dK = /FTd dk > /Ud dk . Accordingly, 
compared to the free trade regime, both firms do more products R&D under bilateral 
anti-dumping regime. Moreover, since kB+KB>kFT+KFT and kFT+KFT>kU+KU, the 
product differentiation is the largest among the three regimes. Furthermore, it is 
intuitive to derive that U B B UK k K k    from kB+KB>kU+KU since B Bk K  
and U UK k , we then have U B B FT FT UK k K k K k     . 
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Proposition 3. If both governments undertake anti-dumping policy, both firms will 
investment more in product R&D than they will do under free trade, resulting in a 
higher aggregate product R&D level. 
 
We are now in the position to investigate whether the constrained firm, Foreign 
firm, has the incentive to petition for an AD protection once the product R&D is taken 
into account. Moreover, we would like to know whether such an AD retaliation 
increases or decreases the incentive of Home firm to petition for an AD protection at 
first. 
As a first step, we shall investigate whether the Foreign firm has an incentive to 
sue Home firm for dumping. From Lemma 2, we know that if the level of investment 
on product R&D is fixed, then Foreign firm has no incentives to petition for an AD 
protection. However, once the level of product R&D is endogenous, we know that 
B UK K  and kB+KB>kU+KU (from Proposition 3), which raises the profit of 
Foreign firm since the products becomes more differentiated and Foreign firm invests 
less in product R&D. This result explains why there are so many antidumping 
retaliations among different countries. Accordingly, we make this result as the 
following proposition. 
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Proposition 4. When the product R&D is taken into account, anti-dumping 
retaliation occurs.  
 
 To investigate whether Home firm has incentive to petition for an AD protection 
at first, we shall compare whether the profit of Home firm under bilateral AD is larger 
than that under free trade. Again, from Lemma 1, given the level if product R&D, we 
have B FT  . Moreover, by decomposing the profit of Home firm under bilateral 
AD yields: 
 
( )
( )
( )
B
B
r d f k
d d k K dk
k K dr k


 

 
  
  
. 
Since B FTk k  and kB+KB>kFT+KFT (Proposition 3), we have ( ) 0d k K   and 
0dk  . The former effect raises the profit of Home firm as the products becomes 
more differentiated, which soften the competition among firms. However, the latter 
effect decreases the profit of home firm as the investment in product R&D is higher. If 
the former effect is large enough, then the profit of Home firm under bilateral AD 
may larger than that under free trade. This raises the incentive of Home firm to 
petition for an AD protection at first. We make this result as the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 5. When the product R&D is taken into account, an anti-dumping 
retaliation may increases the incentive of Home firm to petition for an 
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anti-dumping protection at first. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper aims to explain several facts about anti-dumping behaviors, including why 
firms withdraw their AD petitions and why AD retaliations occur. We find that the 
level of product R&D plays an important. Under the case of unilateral AD, the 
protected firm invests less on product R&D while the constrained firm invests more; 
however, the aggregate investment on product R&D decreases as a whole, which may 
lead to a too intensive market competition and dampens the profit of protected firm. 
Therefore, the protected firm may withdraw its AD petition. Moreover, we show that 
the constrained firm has the incentive to petition for an AD retaliation only if the level 
of product R&D is taken into account. Finally, such an AD retaliation may increase 
the constrained firm to petition for an AD protection as first if the aggregate product 
R&D under bilateral AD is large enough. 
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